To what extent are developmental states emerging within Africa and what policies could be adopted to support them?

understructureThis essay is concerned with analysing what role, if any, the model of the developmental tell depose play indoors Africa. The impression of the developmental earth has origins in the fruitful development in eastmostern Asia. This interrogation will look to take apart the relevance of the existing model to contemporary Ghana. The paper will overly look at the issue to which the favourable conditions for growth that existed in East Asia could ever be replicated in Africa (for a brief thickset of the contemporary debate see United Nations scotch and Social Council (UNESC), 2013).As a imprint of knowledgeableness to the topic, this probe will start with a brief definition of a developmental subject concord to the lit successionture before moving on to look at what characteristics make up a distinctive developmental state. A brief analysis will determine the extent to which on that point is agreement within the literature. From here, the paper will look a t the origins of the developmental state model born out of the experiences in East Asia as well as exploring some of the major academician contri plainlyions to the developmental state debate. Here, the research will touch upon the relevance of these contributions within the Afri smoke context.The second section will be the of import critical analysis around the extent to which developmental states atomic number 18 emerging within Africa or whether the impossibility theorem (Mkanadwire, 2001) continues to hold water. Following that, the paper will examine what policies argon needed to support these fledgling developmental states, according to the literature.The third and final chapter will provide case studies from Ghana, examining whether this body politic possesses any of the defining features that realise a developmental state. The aim here is to show, via a practical example, that developmental states are possible in Africa but are also far from similar to East Asiatic e xamples. Here, the paper will also impinge oner a critique to show the struggles and developmental threats for Africa as a counter argument that developmental states are emerging within Africa.Starting first with a definition of a developmental state, the study immediately encounter some points of contention. Firstly, as Mbabazi and Taylor (2005) point out, the definition of a developmental state does not correspond directly with stinting performance. That is, a country which is performing well economically is not needed developmental. Rather, the current accepted definition of a developmental state is one that is ideologically enjoin towards development, where the state seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and semipolitical resources to the t take in of economic development (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005 2).Traditionally. developmental states are associated with locations that move over economic development as a leading governmental policy which has the potential to form bodies which poop facilitate these policies and targets. To be classed as a developmental state, there must be a governmental ability to weave formal and informal networks of collaboration between civilians and public officials whilst promoting macro-economic stability and maintaining an institutional framework that provides law and order, rough-and-ready administration of justice and peaceful resolution of conflicts, ensures property rights and appropriate pedestal investments, and advances human development (Mkandawire, 1999, 2010 UNESC, 2013 2). otherwises have added to the definition of a developmental state in that it must be willing to engage itself directly with the direction and pace of economic development using merchandise conforming mechanisms to allocate economic resources, rather than simply falling back on a uncoordinated, laissez-faire views to market forces (Johnson, 1982 319-20 Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005 4 Meyns and Musamba, 2010 13, UNESC, 2013 2).Now that a c lear definition of what a developmental state is, along with a taste of what key theoretical features need to be present has been establi mould, this paper will take a step back to look at the origins of the developmental state in terms of East Asiatic experiences. Here, the study will see some of the main contributions made to the literature from leading scholars, which will shed some light on what are held to be the key theoretical features of developmental states. This will consequently be used as an entry point into the interchange nigh to what extent these theoretical features are operable, and how it might be applied within the context of this research.As touched upon above, much of the contemporary discussion about developmental states has its roots in research conducted on the experiences faced by the East Asiatic tigers (for the original research see Amsden, 1989 Haggard, 1990 Johnson, 1982). There seems to be a general consensus within the academic literate as to the key features that facilitate the Asiatic tigers to superior levels of growth and these are the followingEmbedded indecorum of state bureaucracyPut onward by Peter Evans (1989, 1995), he argued that strong state institutions have a signifi bungholet influence towards the promotion of development in the Tiger economies because they avoided being captured by vested lodge ins. The East Asian states have professional bureaucracies, in which the employees had real opportunities for advancement so they avoided the temptation to engage in extra rent-seeking (income providing) activities. Simultaneously, Evans noted that the state administration remained attached to or embedded in society so that it did not stick isolated and self-serving, so that it could continually redefine its policy goals and aims.Market conforming pr unconstipatedtive Charlmers Johnson (1982), who studied Japans super successful post-war recovery, found similar results to Evans. He notes that small, inexpensive, professional and good state bureaucracies or pilot bureaucratic agencies, like the Japanese Ministry for Inter field Trade and Industry (MITI), which had chest over economic policy, allowed those states to promote civic interests whilst maintaining a high level of prestige and genuineness (Johnson, 1982 49). well-nigh importantly for Johnson, however, was the fact that the government of Japan provided national administrators with the withalls and authority to intervene directly in the parsimony under the condition that all work would stick to neo-liberal market principles (Johnson 1982 315-316).Political primacyAccording to Adrian Leftwich politics is the preponderating variable which determines the concept of the developmental state as well as the developmental success or failure in all human societies (Meynes and Musamba, 200516). Leftwich (2000 4) argues that developmental states possess the following six factors during their emergenceThe armorial bearing of development-oriented political elite who possess high levels of commitment and will to attain economic growth. A causeful, professional, highly competent, insulated and career-based bureaucracy Civil society is relatively weak and disorganised A high capacity for the effective economic management of both domestic and private economic interests An uneasy mix of repression and non-adherence to human rights Performance-based legitimacy of the governing political elite, and which takes precedence over procedural legitimacy (Leftwich, 2000174).It seems that Leftwich differs in his arguments from Evans, in that Leftwich observes an im residuum. Yet it can be seen that there exists a significant state body which has a powerful bureaucracy which can effectively take care of the interest of the private economic. Then, this leads to a frail society which has no counsel of influencing the ruling elite.Alternatives to neo-liberal economicsConceptually speaking, the developmental st ate is often located in-between a go off market capitalist economic system and a centrally-planned economic system conjoining private ownership with state guidance (Woo-Cumings 1999 2). This imagines it is neither purely capitalist nor totally complaisantist.With regards to the relationship between the developmental state and interventionism is concerned, the developmental state is an embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of the state to guide investment in a way that promotes a certain solidaristic vision of national economy (Loriaux 1999 24).Ha-Joon Chang, demonstrates that economic development requires a state which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships that can support sustained industrialisation or in short, a developmental state (Chang, 1999183). Therefore, the installation of the developmental state concept leads to the formation of a interventionist state.Are developmental states emerging in Africa some(p renominal) African states have behaved a surge in development across the independence years, that started from the early sixties onwards (Woo?Cumings 1999 19?20). However, subsequently, governance deteriorated and efforts to spread education stalled National armies discredited themselves through bloody coups and ingrained divisions along ethnic lines (Woo?Cumings 1999 19?20).Since those dark times, there has been increasing evidence to suggest that developmental states are now emerging in sub-Saharan Africa. However, existing literature expresses concerns with regards to if this the correct route for the African countries. For example, Woo-Cumings warns us that the developmental state can be good in relation to its (economic) effectiveness but it can also be a grim model in terms of human rights and lack of majority rule (Woo-Cumings 1999 19?20).After initial developmental optimism, by the 1990s, things had changed the African state had become the most demonised soc ial institution in Africa, vilified for its weaknesses, its over-extension, its interference with the smooth portioning of markets, its repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its absence (Mkadawire, 2001 293). The legacy this has left behind is an academic thesis that posits that the developmental state concept is not feasible under prevalent conditions in Africa known as the impossibility theorem (Mkadawire, 2001 293).Lewis and Stein (1997) for example, when investigating the possibility of translating the Asian model and replicating it in the African context argue that while greater political insulation of economic policy makers could reasonably be achieved in African countries, the extensive coordinated economic interventions of the East Asian states are far beyond the administrative capabilities of most African governments.Scepticism has been widespread within the literature regarding the prospects for the formation of viable developmental states , owing mostly to the scummy record of state-led development efforts during the immediate post-independence era of African governance. state of matter intervention in the economy, according to Ake, became a way for the governing elite to cumulate wealth for themselves (Ake, 1996). Others have put forward that the African continent lacks adequate political superstructure and the leadership necessary for implementing policy of a developmental nature (Birdsall, 2007 580).The impossibility theorem is a collection of arguments that posits that the developmental state concept in Africa is not possible, and, in particular, demonstrates scepticism towards the East Asian development experiences and if these could act as a model for Africa (Mkandawire 2001) . Those who advance the impossibility theorem also argue that this model is incompatible with globalization. They argue that the current outside(a) regulatory architecture and the dominance of the neo-liberal parad igm supported by the World Bank, the IMF and the Washington Consensus have created an surroundings that is largely inhospitable for the viability of the developmental state approach (Beeson 2006 34-39).Yet, supporters of the emergence of African developmental states argue that the poor performance and lack of potential for African countries to achieve rapid state-led development is due to a diagonal and unfair comparison of the achievements of the East Asian models (Mkandawire, 2001, Chang, 2006, UNCTAD, 2007).The fact is, developmental states are emerging in Africa and there evidence for them to promote a developmental-state approach. It is now accepted that market-based economies need a successful state to function and develop. African nations are beginning to satisfy the fundamental needs of their people (Manzavinos, 2004).This journey of rediscovering the role of the state has been simultaneous with the recognition of that of economic institutions. Douglass North publish ed a book in 1990 called, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, which argues against the idea that institutions simply come about as a by-product of economic growth, and put forward that improvements in institutions are essential preconditions and determinants of growth (Manzavinos, 2004).The final part of this paper now turns to the Ghana case-study in order to find out what policies could support the growth of African developmental states.Ghana was the initial nation in Africa to gain independence and has since undergone a stable transition since then. The Nkrumah were soon established as the best-selling(predicate) legitimacy of the state, Ghana has since managed to escape the violence that has occurred in other Sub-Sahara states.As within all academic debates there are two sides to the argument those that put forward that Ghana is a model of a developmental state and those who argue the contrary. Put simply, Ghana has failed to capture successful long-te rm development but that does not necessary mean it is not a developmental state. Ghanas growth could be seen as a mirage rather than a miracle as some key structural changes as highlighted in the introduction of this paper have not occurred. However, Dzorgbo (2001 5) observes that it has confronted the challenge of increasing dependence on foreign aid, an exponential function external debt, high rates of unemployment and poverty, and de-industrialization resultant from the elimination of protective measures.In terms of what policies Ghana can implement to support itself as a developmental state it could start with intervening with its fiscal and financial policy as done by the East Asian tigers during their developmental phase. The main aim of this would be to reduce government spending The CCP involveed an exaggerated, bloated vision of development of which the crucial feature was the number of physiologic structures and general infrastructure that could be constructed rather th an assessing the actual social and material needs of the people (Osei, 1999 6). This would mean that Ghana should instead rely on state monetary policy to restore macroeconomic balance and cease to continue along the path of government spending which is dependent on bank credit. This creates an environment which is inhospitable to foreign and private investment because excess lending and inflation results in low (even negative) interest rates that further discourage future investment (Osei, 1999 6).This paper puts forward that the policy that Ghana should adopt is one of state intervention in its monetary policy instead of a laissez-faire attitude to economics. However, in the case of Ghana it is easy to see why the over extension of the state could become a problem given that the Divestiture Implementation Committee, established in 1990 under the patronage of the IMF, gradually auctioned off state enterprises to the highest bidder (Rothchild, 1991 206). As such, Ghana has an uncom fortable history of state interference within the economy.Once hailed as the frontier of Africa and in many ways similar to the Asian tigers, Ghana still must endure significant obstacles as such formulas for success set by the IMF and the Washington Consensus have continually failed to develop about change.Taking into account the dynamic and unpredictable periods of economic policy formation we must ask ourselves if it even possible to generalize a developmental theory for Ghana or even Africa as a wholeAke strongly disagrees because development paradigms largely ignore the specificity and historicity of African countries, it puts them in a position in which everything is relevant to them and nothing is uniquely significant for understanding them (Dzorgbo, 200113).In conclusion, it can be seen that drawing on the experience of the East Asian tigers economies cannot be effectively applied to Africa as the contexts too different. 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